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I.  INTRODUCTION  
In 2013 North Dakota enacted House Bill 1305, which purports to prohibit 
doctors from performing abortions when they are aware that the abortion is sought 
solely for purposes of sex selection or because the fetus has been diagnosed with a 
“genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”1   At the time that 
H.B. 1305 was enacted, several other states had already enacted laws banning sex-
selective abortions as part of a larger trend of legislation banning abortion based on 
the motive of the pregnant woman.2  North Dakota, however, is the first state to 
single out women who seek to terminate a pregnancy because of a genetic anomaly,3  
which has sparked a debate within the disability rights movement.4   
This provision in North Dakota’s statute deserves special attention and analysis, 
partly because it may become a model for other states, but also because it departs 
from the traditional legislative approach to abortion.  In the past, if the law has made 
any distinction on the basis of fetal health it has made it easier, not harder, for a 
woman to obtain an abortion in situations where there is evidence of fetal 
impairment.5  This was true in the United States before Roe v. Wade was decided,6 
                                                          
 1 H.B. 1305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2, (N.D. 2013), 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0351-01000.pdf?20140813205421.  
 2 See BRIAN CITRO ET AL., REPLACING MYTHS WITH FACTS: SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION 
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Sujatha Jesudason et al. eds., 2014) (noting that eight states 
have enacted laws prohibiting sex-selective abortion and that 21 states and the federal 
government have considered such legislation since 2009); see also Justin Gillette, Pregnant 
and Prejudiced: the Constitutionality of Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions, 88 
Wash. L. Rev. 645, 646 (2013). 
 3 See Eric Eckholm, Bill in North Dakota Bans Abortion After Heart Beat is Found, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/us/north-dakota-
approves-bill-to-ban-abortions-after-heartbeat-is-found.html?_r=0.  Missouri also considered 
legislation banning abortion on the ground of “genetic abnormality” but the bill failed to pass.  
See H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb.,1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013), available at 
http://www.house.mo.gov/billsummary.aspx?bill=HB386&year=2013&code=R.  
 4 See Amy Julia Becker, North Dakota’s Ban Is a Bad Way to Stop Selective Abortion: 
Culture as a Whole Needs to Change to be More Supportive of Children with Chromosomal 
Conditions, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 4, 2013, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/04/north-dakotas-ban-is-a-bad-way-to-stop-
selective-abortion/274676/ (summarizing opposing views of the bill within the disability 
rights movement); see also Alison Piepmeier, Outlawing Abortion Won’t Help Children with 
Down Syndrome, Motherlode, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2013.  
 5 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR 
HEALTH SYSTEMS 93 (2d ed. 2012), available at 
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe_abortion/9789241548434/en; see 
also GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS (July 1, 2014), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf (noting exceptions 
for “fetal abnormality” to restrictions on abortion or funding for abortion in the states of 
Maryland, Mississippi, Virginia, and Utah).  
 6 See LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT 
SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 272 (2012) (noting 
that before Roe v. Wade was decided, the American Law Institute adopted a model statute that 
would allow abortion in certain circumstances, including “grave physical or mental defect” of 
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and it continues to be true in certain countries around the world that do not recognize 
a general right to abortion but allow it in certain circumstances.7  Health 
professionals also routinely counsel pregnant women to undergo prenatal diagnostic 
testing, with the tacit understanding that she will likely elect to terminate the 
pregnancy if testing reveals a fetal impairment.8 The underlying assumption – that it 
is good public policy to permit, and perhaps even encourage, prospective parents to 
prevent the birth of babies with disabilities – may seem self-evident to many people.  
Yet it is a deeply painful subject within the disability rights movement.9 Thus, it is 
not surprising that disability rights discourse is increasingly relied upon in 
campaigns to restrict access to abortion in the United States, both in state legislative 
debates10 and constitutional litigation.11 
                                                          
the fetus and that the majority of Americans supported allowing abortion in these 
circumstances).   
 7 Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Fact Sheet: The World’s Abortion Laws Map 2013 Update, 
REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG, 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/AbortionMap_Factsheet
_2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) (especially columns I and II, which indicate, with the 
letter “F,” those countries that are considered to have restrictive abortion laws but do permit 
abortion on the ground of fetal impairment) [hereinafter Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Fact Sheet]; 
see also Reed Boland, Second Trimester Abortion Laws Globally: Actuality, Trends and 
Recommendations, 2010 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS, NOV. 2010, at 67, 68 (reporting 
that approximately sixty-nine countries specifically authorize abortions in the second trimester 
on the ground of fetal impairment). 
 8 See generally Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1009 UTAH L. REV. 845, 866 (2009). 
 9 See generally Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, in ABORTION 
WARS, A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 1950 TO 2000 374 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998); Erik 
Parens et al., The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and 
Recommendations, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at s1 (Supp. 1999), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3527746/pdf; Adrienne Asch, Lawrence O. Gostin 
& Diane M. Johnson, Respecting Persons with Disabilities and Preventing Disability: Is there 
a Conflict?, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT 
BUT EQUAL, 319–46 (Stanley S. Herr, Lawrence O. Gostin & Harold Hongju Koh, eds., 2003); 
Steven A. Holmes, Abortion Issue Divides Advocates for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1991. 
 10 See N.D. Legis. Branch Video, Senate Floor Session for HB 1305, ND.GOV (Mar. 15, 
2013), 
http://video.legis.nd.gov/pb3/powerbrowser_Desktop.aspx?ContentEntityId=228&date=20130
315&tnid=10&browser=0#agenda. 
 11 See Brief of Amici Curiae Jerome Lejune Foundation, USA, et al. in Support of 
Petitioners, Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (2013) (No. 12-16670), available at 
http://bdfund.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/FILED-AmicusLeJeuneSDiDSC-
BDF.pdf. The brief notes that most abortions conducted after 20 weeks are conducted because 
prenatal testing revealed a fetal impairment and it argues that Arizona H.B. 2036 (2012) 
therefore advanced a legitimate state interest of disfavoring disability-selective abortion by 
prohibiting abortions after 20 weeks except in cases of medical emergency. Arizona’s law was 
invalidated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit because a state cannot, under 
controlling precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, prohibit a woman from terminating her 
pregnancy prior to viability. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013, 1231), cert. 
denied 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014); see also Adam Liptak & Fernanda Santos, Supreme Court 
Won’t Hear Arizona Appeal on Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014, available at 
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This article argues that we should consider not only American constitutional 
law12 but also comparative law and emerging international human rights norms, in 
order to navigate the difficult issue of abortion on the basis of fetal impairment. The 
United States is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)13 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).14 It is also a signatory (but not a full 
State Party) to several other relevant treaties, including the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),15 the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),16 and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).17 The CRPD is particularly relevant because it 
rejects the medical model of disability and embraces the social model, defining 
disability as a form of social oppression.18  The CRPD also has numerous provisions 
that are relevant to reproductive justice and the right to life.  The U.S. Senate came 
close to ratifying the CRPD in December 2012,19 falling just a few votes short of the 
                                                          
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/us/supreme-court-wont-hear-arizona-appeal-on-abortion-
ban.html?_r=0 (providing press coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the 
appeal). 
 12 See generally Greer Donley, Does the Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal 
Anomaly?: Examining the Potential for Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of 
Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291 (2013) (analyzing why a 
proposed federal law prohibiting disability-selective abortion would be unconstitutional). 
 13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 
23 Mar. 1976). Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx 
[hereinafter “ICCPR”]. 
 14 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10,1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, 
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx [hereinafter “CAT”]. 
 15 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted 
Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. 
A/34/46,1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx [hereinafter “CEDAW”]. 
 16 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 
UN GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 
1990).  Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx 
[hereinafter “CRC”]. 
 17 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007). Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/ConventionRightsPersonsWithDisabilities.
aspx [hereinafter “CRPD”].  
 18 See Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 287 (2007); 
Rosemary Kayees & Philip French, Out of Darkness Into Light? Introducing the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008). 
 19 Louis Jacobson, 38 Republicans vote against ratification, but treaty could still get 
another vote next year, POLITIFACT (Dec. 4, 2012, 2:40 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-
o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/88/sign-the-un-convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-wi/. 
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two-thirds majority that is required to ratify a treaty under the U.S. Constitution.20   
In August 2014, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the CRPD 
again,21 and the disability rights movement is hopeful that the full Senate will 
eventually ratify the treaty.22  In any event, as a signatory to the treaty, the United 
States is already obligated to “refrain from acts that would defeat the object and 
purpose” of the treaty while preparing for ratification.23  This is a principle of 
customary international law, codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.24 
Part II of the article introduces North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 and explains why its 
prohibition of abortion based upon a “genetic abnormality” is potentially more 
significant than previous legislation purporting to prohibit only sex-selective 
abortions.  Part III considers the relationship between the history of eugenics and the 
modern law of abortion, demonstrating why this is such a sensitive issue for people 
who either live with disabilities themselves or have reared children with disabilities.   
Part IV of the article analyzes the relationship between abortion and international 
human rights law.  This section begins by briefly summarizing the emerging 
jurisprudence on access to abortion under human rights treaties other than the 
CRPD. It then introduces the CRPD and its relevant provisions, summarizing the 
drafting history of the articles that are particularly relevant to the rights to life, to 
create a family, and to reproductive health services. This section then uses Spain and 
Hungary as case studies to investigate the approach that the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the treaty-monitoring body for 
the CRPD) has taken to the issue of abortion on the basis of fetal impairment, an 
approach that has alarmed some advocates for women’s reproductive rights. Part V 
concludes the article by suggesting public policy responses that would continue to 
respect reproductive freedom while also addressing the history of eugenics and 
discrimination against persons with disabilities. 
                                                          
 20 Ironically, the small group of Senators who blocked U.S. ratification of the CRPD in 
2012 often claim that the treaty is “pro-abortion,” although this is not the case.  For discussion 
of the failure of the United States to ratify the treaty in 2012, see Carole J. Petersen, The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Using International Law to Promote 
Social and Economic Development in the Asia Pacific, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 821 (2013).  
 21 Mario Trujillo, Foreign relations committee approves disability treaty, THE HILL (July 
22, 2014, 2:33 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/international/212991-foreign-relations-
committee-approves-disability-treaty.  
 22 See Press Release, Sen. Tom Harkin, Harkin Applauds Committee Approval of CRPD, 
Urges Full Senate Consideration (July 22, 2014), available at 
http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=6277e42e-7bf5-414e-8040-
b26c751dcdbf. 
 23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 312(3) (1987).  
 24 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
The Vienna Convention was adopted and opened for signature in 1969 and entered into force 
Jan. 27, 1980. Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it does not 
dispute that Article 18 reflects customary international law and therefore binds all nations. 
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II.  INTRODUCING NORTH DAKOTA’S H.B. 1305:  WHY THE BAN ON 
DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION IS MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN PREVIOUS BANS ON 
SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION  
H.B. 1305 is part of a package of legislation enacted in 2013 that made North 
Dakota’s Abortion Control Act one of the most restrictive state laws in the United 
States,25 and also set up a major challenge to Roe v. Wade.26  The North Dakota bill 
that attracted the most public attention in 2013 was H.B. 1456, widely known as the 
“heartbeat bill” because it purports to prohibit abortion as soon as a heartbeat is 
detectable,27 which can be as early at six weeks.28  However, in the same year, the 
North Dakota legislature also enacted S.B. 2305, which required physicians 
performing abortions in the state to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 
miles,29 and H.B. 1297, which prohibited doctors from administering certain drugs in 
a protocol that many consider to be the standard of care for non-surgical abortions.30  
                                                          
 25 Eric Eckholm, Judge Blocks North Dakota’s Abortion Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/us/judge-blocks-north-dakota-
abortion-restrictions.html.  
 26 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Since Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court case law 
concerning the right to an abortion has consistently held that a woman has a constitutional 
right to choose to terminate her pregnancy before the fetus is viable. While a state may 
regulate the mode and manner of abortion prior to fetal viability, it may not proscribe a 
woman from electing abortion or impose an undue burden on her choice. 
 27 See H.B. 1456, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013), 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0304-02000.pdf?20140813210157; 
see also Cheryl Wetzstein, N.D. Bill Would Bar Most abortions if Heartbeat Found, 
WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 17, 2013, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/17/nd-bill-would-bar-most-abortions-if-
heartbeat-foun/?page=all.  
 28 See H.B. 1456, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013), 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0304-02000.pdf?20140813210157; 
see also MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, No. 1:13-CV-071, 2014 WL 1653201, *1, *15 
(D.N.D. Apr. 16, 2014) (holding the “heartbeat” bill unconstitutional). The proponents knew 
that the law would be held unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade and are hoping that the U.S. 
Supreme Court will eventually hear an appeal and overrule or seriously limit Roe v. Wade. See 
John Eligon & Erik Eckholm, New Laws Ban Most Abortions in North Dakota, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 26, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/us/north-dakota-governor-
signs-strict-abortion-limits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 29 See S.B. 2305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013), 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0796-01000.pdf?20140813210437. 
 30 See H.B. 1297, 62d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2011), 
http://legis.nd.gov/assembly/62-2011/documents/11-0506-04000.pdf?20141002201500; and 
Jessica Mason Pieklo, North Dakota Supreme Court Considers Whether There Is a State Right 
to Abortion, RH REALITY CHECK (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/12/12/north-dakota-supreme-court-considers-whether-a-
state-right-to-abortion-exists/; see also Heather D. Boonstra, Medication Abortion Restrictions 
Burden Women and Providers—and Threaten U.S. Trend Toward Very Early Abortion,  16(1) 
GUTTMACHER POLICY REVIEW (Winger 2013), pp. 18-21, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/16/1/gpr160118.html (explaining how state laws, 
including legislation enacted in North Dakota, seek to prevent abortion providers from 
following the most advanced protocols for nonsurgical abortions). 
2015] ABORTION ON THE BASIS OF FETAL IMPAIRMENT 127 
 
While supporters characterized these two bills as protecting women’s health, the 
underlying goal was not to make abortion safer, but rather to make it more difficult 
to obtain.31  Like the heartbeat bill, these two bills were drafted with the intention of 
reducing the incidence of abortion generally in North Dakota, regardless of the 
pregnant woman’s motivations for seeking to terminate the pregnancy.  
All three of the bills mentioned above – H.B. 1297, S.B. 2305, and H.B. 1456 – 
have been successfully challenged in the U.S. District Court for the District of North 
Dakota.32  North Dakota appealed a permanent injunction of H.B. 1297 and a 
temporary injunction of S.B. 2305.33 The state also appealed a judgment that H.B. 
1456 (the heartbeat bill) is unconstitutional because it imposes an undue burden on a 
woman seeking an abortion.34 As of July 2014, the state’s appeals were pending in 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Governor of North Dakota has made it 
clear that he is prepared to allocate a significant amount of public money to defend 
these three laws in court.35 
Interestingly, although it was initially named in a test case, H.B. 1305 has not yet 
been the subject of substantive judicial scrutiny.36  H.B. 1305 is different from the 
other three bills that North Dakota enacted in 2013 because it does not seek to 
restrict abortion generally.  Rather, H.B. 1305 targets abortions requested for what 
                                                          
 31 See, e.g., Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (Mar. 5, 
2009), http://reproductiverights.org/en/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap 
(critiquing abortion legislation that has the effect of making abortions more difficult to obtain 
and more risky for women). 
 32 MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, No. 09-2011-CV-02205 (E. Cent. Dist. Ct. N.D. July 15, 
2013), available at http://rhrealitycheck.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/2013-07-15_MKBvBurdick_Perm_Injunction.pdf (Memorandum 
Opinion and Order For Permanent Injunction). MKB originally challenged a 2011 amendment 
from HB 1297 pertaining to restrictions on medication for abortions on February 2012; 
however, the plaintiffs amended their complaint in May 2013 and were permitted to 
supplement an additional challenge for SB 2305 with their complaint. Nat’l P’ship Women & 
Families, In the News: MKB Management Corp. v. Burdick, REPRO HEALTH WATCH, available 
at http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/News2?id=34416 (last visited Oct.11, 2014). 
 33 Id. The state agreed (in a negotiated settlement) that the clinic’s doctors can maintain 
admitting privileges as long as the law requires them to do so; however, if the clinic’s 
admitting privileges are ever revoked or not renewed, the clinic may file a new lawsuit 
challenging S.B. 2305.  Id. 
 34 MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, No. 1:13-CV-071, 2014 WL 1653201, *1, *10 (D.N.D. 
Apr. 16, 2014). 
 35 James MacPherson, North Dakota Gov. Jack Dalrymple Approves 6-week Abortion 
Ban, WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 26, 2013, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/26/north-dakota-gov-jack-dalrymple-
approves-6-week-ab/. 
 36 As explained below, H.B. 1305 was initially challenged in the same lawsuit that 
challenged the heartbeat bill but the plaintiffs apparently reconsidered as they asked the court 
to dismiss the claims regarding H.B. 1305 early in the litigation. Jessica Mason Pieklo, Red 
River Clinic Asks Court to Dismiss Its Legal Challenge to Sex-Selection and Fetal Anomaly 
Bans, RH REALITY CHECK (Sept. 12, 2013, 1:04 PM), 
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/09/12/red-river-clinic-asks-court-to-dismiss-its-legal-
challenge-to-sex-and-fetal-anomaly-bans/. 
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the legislature deemed to be particularly bad motivations – the desire to practice sex 
selection or to prevent the birth of a child with a genetic disorder.37  H.B. 1305 made 
amendments to the definitions in North Dakota’s Abortion Control Act38 and added a 
new section prohibiting abortion – at any time during the pregnancy – if the doctor 
knows that the pregnant woman is terminating the pregnancy solely because of the 
sex of the fetus or because the fetus “has been diagnosed with either a genetic 
abnormality, or a potential for a genetic abnormality.”39  Supporters of H.B. 1305 
argued that this provision serves an essential public interest by affirming North 
Dakota’s policy of prohibiting gender and disability discrimination.40  Although 
grouped together in the same section of H.B. 1305, the two prohibitions must be 
analyzed separately in order to understand their potential impact on pregnant women 
and the doctors who serve them. 
H.B. 1305’s prohibition on abortion for the purpose of sex selection is not 
ground-breaking, but rather is similar to laws that have been adopted in seven other 
states:  Illinois, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Kansas, North Carolina, South Dakota, and 
Oklahoma.41 Arizona further prohibits abortion on the ground of the race of the 
fetus,42 something that has also been attempted at the federal level by members of the 
U.S. Congress.43  Supporters of this type of legislation have invariably invoked the 
discourse of equality and nondiscrimination, portraying the legislation as protecting 
the civil rights of vulnerable groups.44  While there is no doubt that the anti-abortion 
movement genuinely deplores the practice of sex-selective abortion, it appears that 
the movement also views the phenomena of sex selection as something that can be 
exploited, part of a broader strategy to dampen women’s support for Roe v Wade.45  
To quote Steven Mosher, who was at that time the President of the Population 
Research Institute, an American anti-abortion organization: 
Banning sex-selective abortion will force supporters of abortion to 
publicly address a question that they will find profoundly disturbing: Is 
the right to abortion a license to destroy children for any and all reasons, 
including that of their sex? Most people of moderate persuasion, even 
                                                          
 37 H.B. 1305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.D. 2013), available at 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0351-01000.pdf?20140813205421. 
 38 N.D. CENTURY CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2013).  
 39 N.D. CENTURY CODE § 14-02.01-04.1 (2013).  
 40 Relating to the Prohibition on Abortions for Sex Selection or Genetic Abnormalities, 
Definitions and Provide a Penalty on H.B. 1305 Before the Hon. Comm. on Human Services, 
63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 22 (N.D. 2013) (statement of Rep. Bette Grande). 
 41 See CITRO ET AL., supra note 2, at 29–30. 
 42 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011) (West). 
 43 See Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act  of  2012, H.R. 3541, 112th Cong. (2012); Prenatal 
Non-Discrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013) (as referred to H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 44 See H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 45 See Steven W. Mosher, President’s Page: Let’s Ban Sex Selective Abortions, 7 PRI 
REVIEW (Mar./Apr. 2007), http://pop.org/content/presidents-page-let-us-ban-sex-selective-
1340. 
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those inclined to be “pro-choice,” will agree that the right of the unborn 
child to life should not depend on whether she (or he) possesses the 
requisite genitalia. Even those who believe in the absolute right to destroy 
the child under any and all circumstances, it is safe to predict, will be 
uncomfortable defending such an extreme position.  This sense of 
contradiction will be further heightened among radical feminists, the 
shock troops of the abortion movement. They may believe that the right to 
abortion is fundamental to women’s emancipation, but many will recoil at 
the thought of aborting their unborn sisters in disproportionate numbers. 
How can they, who so oppose patriarchy and discrimination on the basis 
of sex, consent to the ultimate form of patriarchy and discrimination, 
namely, the elimination of baby girls solely on account of their sex?  
Many will be silent, while others will defend abortion with less 
conviction.46 
Mosher also predicted that pro-choice advocates would be left “stammering and 
stuttering” because they would unable to respond to the moral and public policy 
arguments against permitting sex-selective abortions.47  
Mosher’s predictions proved to be somewhat exaggerated.  It is, of course, deeply 
disturbing for feminists to consider that reproductive freedom will be used, at certain 
times and in certain places, to prevent female births.48   Public opinion polls also 
indicate that a majority of the American public disapproves of abortion when sought 
for this purpose.49  However, it does not appear that Mosher’s strategy of proposing 
state legislation to prohibit sex-selective abortion has made large numbers of 
feminists less willing to defend the right to abortion under American constitutional 
law.50  Nor has the issue divided the American feminist movement in the way that 
some other contentious issues (such as laws prohibiting commercial sex or 
pornography) have divided the movement. Many of the organizations fighting for 
reproductive rights have gradually broadened their focus to include issues of 
reproductive justice, rather than focusing only on abortion.51 Nonetheless, in general, 
                                                          
 46 Id. 
 47 Steven W. Mosher, A New Front in the Abortion Wars: PreNDA Seeks Race and Sex-
based Equality for the Unborn, 18 PRI REVIEW (Nov./Dec. 2008), http://pop.org/content/a-
new-front-in-abortion-wars-prenda-seeks-1602. 
 48 See, e.g., April Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex-Selective Abortion: Solely a 
Matter of Choice?, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 161 (1995) (analyzing the limits of choice as a 
value in the context of sex-selective abortion). 
 49 See, e.g., Charlotte Lozier Inst., Poll: 77% of Americans Support Ban on Sex-Selective 
Abortion, CLI PRESS RELEASES (May 17, 2012), http://www.lozierinstitute.org/news-
room/press-releases/ (announcing results of public opinion poll of 1,016 adults). 
 50 See, e.g., Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Even More than Abortion: the Constitutional 
Importance of Roe v. Wade and the Right to Privacy, NWLC.ORG (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/even_more_than_abortion_factsheet_1-18-13.pdf. 
 51 One such organization is “The Center on Reproductive Rights and Justice,” a social 
justice research center that stresses the importance of  (1) the right to have a child; (2) the 
right not to have a child; and (3) the right to parent children. UC Berkeley Sch. of Law, 
Purpose: Mission Section, BERKELYLAW, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/14379.htm 
(emphasizing the importance of people having the social, financial, political, and legal 
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American feminist organizations continue to defend Roe v. Wade,52 and feminists 
believe that access to abortion is an essential component of women’s right to 
equality and bodily integrity.53   
Pro-choice organizations also argue that instead of prohibiting abortion, the most 
effective way to discourage sex selection is to adopt laws and policies that improve 
the status of women in society, so that prospective parents will value male and 
female babies equally.54 The World Health Organization and other international 
agencies that have studied the problems of son preference and sex selection share 
this view.55  Additionally, recent research confirms that sex-selective abortion is far 
less common in the United States than has been portrayed by the anti-abortion 
movement.56 This makes it easier for pro-choice feminists to dismiss the campaign to 
prohibit sex-selective abortion in the United States as the classic “red herring,” a 
                                                          
conditions required to make genuine choices about reproduction); see also Ctr. For Reprod. 
Rights, Our Issues, REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG, http://reproductiverights.org/en/our-issues (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2014) (listing access to abortion along with access to publicly funded health 
care to help women have safe and healthy pregnancies). The Center for Reproductive Rights 
also campaigns against forced sterilization. See, e.g., Ctr. For Reprod. Rights, Czech 
Government Apologizes to Victims of Forced Sterilization, REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG (Nov. 
25, 2009), http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/czech-government-apologizes-to-
victims-of-forced-sterilization (reporting on a successful joint advocacy project of the Center 
for Reproductive Rights and Poradna, a Slovakian organization). 
 52 See, e.g., Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., supra note 50.  
 53 See Terri Susan Fine, Generations, Feminist Beliefs and Abortion Rights Support, J. 
INT’L WOMEN’S STUD., May 2006, at 126, available at 
http://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=jiws. 
 54 See, e.g., Ctr. For Reprod. Rights, Statement of Policies and Principles on 
Discrimination Against Women and Sex-Selective Abortion Bans, REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG, 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Statement%20on%20Se
x%20Selective%20Abortion%20Bans%20FIN_1.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2014); Ctr. For 
Reprod. Rights, U.S. House to Vote on Unconstitutional Abortion Ban, 
REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS.ORG (May 30, 2012), http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/us-
house-to-vote-on-unconstitutional-federal-abortion-ban. 
 55 WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., PREVENTING GENDER-BIASED SEX SELECTION: AN 
INTERAGENCY STATEMENT, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 10 (2011), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/PreventingGenderBiasedSexSelectio
n.pdf (recommending systemic changes to reduce son preference but also cautioning that 
efforts to manage or limit sex selection should also not hamper or limit access to safe abortion 
services).  
 56 Anti-abortion legislators tend to rely upon reports that more male than female babies are 
born in certain communities; however these statistics do not necessarily document sex-
selective abortion because prospective parents can influence the sex of their future child 
through other prenatal methods. For example, they can use artificial insemination and “sperm 
sorting,” whereby only sperm that will produce the desired sex are allowed to fertilize the egg. Sex 
selection can also be achieved through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis: eggs are removed from 
a woman, fertilized outside of her body, and only the embryos of the desired sex are implanted in 
the uterus. These sex selection procedures are legal and provided by fertility clinics in the United 
States. See CITRO ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. 
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misuse of the discourse of equality, and a distraction from the more fundamental 
debate on access to reproductive health services.57   
On the other hand, pro-choice organizations do not appear particularly eager to 
challenge the state laws that prohibit sex-selective abortion.58  While this decision 
may arise from a need to conserve limited litigation funds, it may also reflect a 
desire to avoid being seen as publicly defending a right to practice sex selection in a 
country that clearly disapproves of it.  As of this writing, constitutional challenges 
were being mounted against only two of the eight states with laws banning sex-
selective abortions – Illinois59 and Arizona.60 In North Dakota, the lawsuit that 
successfully challenged the “heartbeat bill” originally included a challenge to H.B. 
1305.61 However, the plaintiffs subsequently requested a motion for dismissal of the 
claims regarding H.B. 1305, which was granted.62 As an explanation for its decision, 
an attorney for the Center for Reproductive Rights stated that it was unclear whether 
H.B. 1305 would have a “direct impact on women seeking abortion services at the 
Red River Women’s Clinic at this time.”63  The Red River Women’s Clinic also 
                                                          
 57 The National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum launched a petition against the 
South Dakota ban on sex-selective abortion, arguing that such bans also perpetuate negative 
stereotypes about Asian Americans. See Nat’l Asian Pacific Am. Women’s Forum, Race and 
Sex Selective Abortion Bans: Don’t Let South Dakota Pass a Racist, Anti-immigrant Abortion 
Ban!, NAPAWF, http://napawf.org/programs/reproductive-justice-2/sex-selection/race-and-
sex-selective-abortion-bans/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
 58 See, e.g., Joshua D. Lee, Racializing Abortion: Standing and the Equal Protection 
Challenge to Sex-Selective Abortion Statutes, NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM (July 10, 
2014), available at http://www.nyujlpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Lee-2014-nyujlpp-
quorum-63.pdf.. 
 59 On March 30, 1993, the U.S. District Court for the N.D. of Illinois issued a consent 
decree that enjoined enforcement of Illinois’ ban on sex-selective abortions for pre-viability 
abortions. See Herbst v. O’Malley, No. 84 C 5602, 1993 WL 59142, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 
1993). 
 60 On May 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), on behalf of NAPA WF 
and the National Association for the advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for Mariocopa 
County, brought a lawsuit against the Arizona Attorney General, the Arizona Medical Board, 
and the Executive Director of the Arizona Medical Board.  The plaintiffs alleged that the Act 
violates the 14th Amendment because it denies equal protection by perpetuating racially 
discriminatory stereotypes of Black and Asian-Pacific women, as well as the Asian culture. 
The U.S. District Court held that the plaintiffs failed to identify any personal injury suffered 
by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error and the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss [12(b)(1)] was granted on Oct. 3, 2013.  The plaintiffs appealed the decision and it is 
currently pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See NAACP v. Horne, No. CV13-
01079-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5519514, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013). 
 61 See Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Center for Reproductive Rights Files 
Lawsuit in North Dakota to Block Nation’s Earliest and Most Extreme Abortion Ban (June 25, 
2013), available at  http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/center-for-reproductive-
rights-files-lawsuit-in-north-dakota-to-block-most-extreme-ban. 
 62 See MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 2d 900, 902 (D.N.D. 2013).   
 63 See James MacPhearson, Judge Dismisses Part of N. Dakota Abortion Lawsuit, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2013, 3:50 PM), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/m/story?id=20227777&sid=81. 
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maintained that H.B. 1305 would not affect it because it does not conduct abortions 
based on genetic abnormalities or the sex of the fetus.64  
These statements made on behalf of the Red River Women’s Clinic are probably 
accurate with respect to the clause in H.B. 1305 prohibiting sex-selective abortions.65  
In fact, as opponents of North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 pointed out during the legislative 
debates, there is no record of any abortions in North Dakota being conducted solely 
for the purpose of sex selection.66  Moreover, even if an abortion was sought for the 
purposes of sex selection, a woman living in North Dakota would probably keep 
silent about her motive, partly out of embarrassment, but also because she might 
anticipate that the doctor would have ethical problems with a sex-selective 
abortion.67  H.B. 1305 does not require the doctor to ask about a woman’s 
motivations for requesting an abortion.68 Thus, even if it could be enforced, it is 
unlikely that North Dakota’s ban on sex-selective abortion would have any 
significant impact on abortion providers or on women seeking abortions in the state.   
However, the same cannot be said of the other main provision in H.B. 1305, 
which prohibits doctors from performing abortions when they are aware that the 
abortion has been requested because of a “genetic abnormality or a potential for a 
genetic abnormality.”69 Unlike sex-selective abortion, a decision to terminate a 
pregnancy on the basis of fetal disability is widely viewed as an acceptable choice in 
the United States.70 For example, one survey of 1,082 pregnant women found that 
three-quarters would consider having an abortion if they knew that their infant would 
be affected by a chromosomal abnormality, 71 while only one-quarter would do so 
                                                          
 64 See Steven Ertelt, Judge’s Ruling Makes North Dakota First to Ban Abortions Based on 
Down Syndrome, LIFE NEWS (Sept 12, 2013, 12:37 PM), 
http://www.lifenews.com/2013/09/12/judges-ruling-makes-north-dakota-first-to-ban-
abortions-based-on-down-syndrome/. 
 65 See CITRO ET AL., supra note 2, at 6 (showing examples of how anti-choice legislators 
have exaggerated the incidence of sex-selective abortion in the United States). 
 66 See N.D. Legis. Branch Video, Senate Floor Session for HB 1305 ND.GOV (Mar. 15, 
2013), 
http://video.legis.nd.gov/pb3/powerbrowser_Desktop.aspx?ContentEntityId=228&date=20130
315&tnid=10&browser=0#agenda. 
 67 See, e.g., ACOG Committee Opinion No. 360, Sex Selection, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (2007), available at http://www.acog.org/Resources-
And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Sex-Selection. Interestingly, the 
Opinion makes an explicit exception for sex selection when it is pursued to prevent the birth 
of a child with a hereditary disease. 
 68 H.B. 1305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.D. 2013), available at 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0351-01000.pdf?20140813205421. 
 69 Id.  
 70 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Genetic Testing + Abortion = ???, N.Y. TIMES,  May 13, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/weekinreview/13harm.html?_r=0 (reporting 
that public opinion polls indicate that 70% of Americans believe that abortion should be legal 
in situations of fetal impairment). 
 71 See D. Hollander, In Certain Circumstances, Women in Prenatal Care Would Not Rule 
Out Having an Abortion in the Future, 37 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH 4, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 2005), available at 
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because of financial hardship.72  It is very common for pregnant women receiving a 
diagnosis of fetal impairment to elect to terminate the pregnancy.73  For example, 
recent studies of Down’s syndrome, which is one of the most frequently occurring 
genetic anomalies,74 have reported a pregnancy termination rate between 67% and 
85% in the United States.75  An international review published in 1999 reported an 
even higher rate of termination (92%) following prenatal diagnosis of Down’s 
syndrome.76 Supporters of North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 emphasized these statistics 
during the legislative debate on the bill, arguing that fetuses with genetic anomalies 
are being “disproportionately targeted in the womb.”77    
Of course, abortions sought after women receive a diagnosis of genetic disorder 
still represent a minority of all abortions in the United States (because most 
abortions are sought by women who do not want to be pregnant).78  But, there is no 
denying that disability-selective abortion is much more common than sex-selective 
abortion in the United States.79 Moreover, a woman who terminates a pregnancy due 
to a genetic anomaly generally makes that decision after discussing the prenatal test 
results with one or more doctors.80 Thus, her medical records may contain records of 
the prenatal tests and any counseling she received, making it easier for a doctor to 
ascertain her motive for seeking an abortion.  Indeed, it would not be unusual for a 
pregnant woman in this situation to express deep sadness regarding the prenatal test 
                                                          
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3720305b.html (citing Learman LA et al., Abortion 
Attitudes of Pregnant Women in Prenatal Care, 192 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1939, 
1939–47 (2005) (describing results of a sample of over a thousand pregnant women)). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Schechtman et al., Decision-Making for Termination of 
Pregnancies with Fetal Anomalies: Analysis of 53,000 Pregnancies, 99 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 216, 216 (Feb. 2002).  
 74 See Jaime L. Natoli et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: a Systematic Review 
of Termination Rates (1995–2011), 32 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 142, 142 (2012) available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pd.2910/full. 
 75 Id. at 144. 
 76 See Caroline Mansfield et al., Termination Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis of Down 
Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic 
Literature Review, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 9, 808–12 (1999) available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced /doi/10.1002/%28SICI%291097-
0223%28199909%2919:9%3C808::AID-PD637%3E3.0.CO;2-B/ (reporting a termination rate 
of 92%). 
 77  Hearing on H.B. 1305 Before the Hon. Comm. on Human Services, 63d Legis. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (testimony of Rep. Bette Grande). 
 78 See, e.g., Gudrum Schultz, The Real Reason Women Choose Abortion, 
ACTIONLIFE.ORG, http://www.actionlife.org/index.php/life-issues/abortion/item/124-the-real-
reason-women-choose-abortion (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). 
 79 Schechtman et al., supra note 73, at 216; Cherry, supra note 48, at 161. 
 80 See generally Genetics Home Reference, Genetics Consultation, GHR.NLM.NIH.GOV, 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/consult?show=all (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (explaining 
prenatal genetic testing). 
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results at the very time that she requests the abortion.81  Thus, the doctor who 
ultimately performs the abortion could easily become aware (either directly from 
something that the woman says or indirectly from her medical records) that a 
diagnosed genetic anomaly was the motivation for seeking an abortion.  According 
to the terms of North Dakota’s H.B. 1305, the doctor would then have a legal 
obligation to refuse to perform the abortion.82   
It should be noted that H.B. 1305 makes no exceptions, not even for fetal 
impairments that will certainly result in death, either late in pregnancy or shortly 
after birth.83 Legislators who opposed H.B. 1305 pointed this out and objected 
strongly to the concept that a woman should be obligated to undergo a full-term 
pregnancy and childbirth after her doctor has medically determined that the fetus is 
likely to die within days of birth.84   Nonetheless, no exceptions were written into the 
statute.  
While North Dakota was the first state to ban disability-selective abortions, it 
may not be the last. Prenatal testing is rapidly becoming more sophisticated, 
allowing pregnant women to obtain genetic information earlier in pregnancy through 
non-invasive blood tests.85 This may increase the incidence of prenatal genetic 
testing and, as a result, disability-selective abortion.86  It may also create an incentive 
for state legislators who oppose abortion to enact laws in other states, patterned after 
H.B. 1305.87  This kind of legislation could have serious implications for women and 
their families, as well as those who provide abortion services.   
Given the potential impact, pro-choice organizations may feel compelled to 
challenge state laws that prohibit disability-selective abortion. The next section 
explains why a challenge to North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 would likely generate strong 
feelings within the disability rights movement. 
 
                                                          
 81 See, e.g., ELIZABETH RING-CASSIDY & IAN GENTLES, WOMEN’S HEALTH AFTER 
ABORTION: THE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 159  (2d ed. 2003). 
 82 See H.B. 1305, 63d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.D. 2013), available at 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-0351-01000.pdf?20140813205421. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See N.D. Legis. Branch Video, Senate Floor Session for HB 1305, ND.GOV (Mar. 15, 
2013), 
http://video.legis.nd.gov/pb3/powerbrowser_Desktop.aspx?ContentEntityId=228&date=20130
315&tnid=10&browser=0#agenda. 
 85 See Victorian Clinical Genetic Servs., Non-Invasive Prenatal Screening, VCGS, 
available at 
http://www.vcgs.org.au/clinical/Documents/PDF/VCGS_PanoramaTest_Brochure.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
 86 See Rachel Rebouche & Karen Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The Intersection of 
Prenatal Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 HOW. L.J. 983, 987 (2012) (suggesting that 
termination of pregnancy due to fetal impairment will become a focal point of public policy 
debates on abortion as prenatal testing becomes more cost-effective and routine). 
 87 See, e.g., Americans United for Life, Order Model Legislation, available at 
http://www.aul.org/legislative-resources/order-model-legislation/ (last visited July 10, 2014) 
(demonstrating how it is relatively easy for legislators to obtain a template for a variety of 
bills restricting access to abortion).   
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III. THE HISTORY OF EUGENICS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE MODERN LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF ABORTION 
Eugenics represents a particularly tragic chapter in the history of discrimination 
against persons with disabilities.  The term “eugenic” (derived from the Greek word 
for “well born”) was originally coined by Francis Galton, who was a cousin of 
Charles Darwin and one of the founders of the English Eugenics Education 
Society.88 While commonly associated with the extreme racist ideology of Nazi 
Germany, eugenic theories were actually embraced before and after World War II, 
and were endorsed by people from a variety of different social backgrounds, political 
convictions, and national affiliations.89  Indeed, eugenic theories were openly 
promoted in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and 
inspired a number of states to enact laws preventing persons with disabilities from 
marrying and reproducing.90 The language used in one Connecticut state statute was 
typical; it prohibited “epileptics, imbeciles, and feebleminded persons” from 
marrying or having extramarital sexual relations before the age of forty-five.91  Many 
state legislatures also enacted laws allowing for “eugenic sterilization,” which 
eventually led to the sterilization of approximately 60,000 Americans.92  When 
Virginia’s sterilization law was challenged in court, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
it in 1927 in the famous case of Buck v. Bell, in which Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes proclaimed, “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”93 It was not until 
1942 that the Supreme Court declared, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, that procreation is a 
fundamental right and thus a statute restricting it must be subjected to the “strict 
scrutiny” standard of constitutional review.94 
Eugenic theories were also influential in Canada.  For example, the provinces of 
Alberta and British Columbia imposed sterilization as a condition for discharging 
inmates from psychiatric institutions based on the assumption that it would not be 
                                                          
 88 Ruth Hubbard, Abortion and Disability: Who Should and Who Should Not Inherit the 
World?, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 75, 75 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 4th ed. 2013). 
 89 See generally Frank Dikotter, Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of 
Eugenics, 103(2) THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, Apr. 1998, at 467, 467 available at  
http://www.frankdikotter.com/publications/race_culture_1.pdf (noting that eugenics was 
embraced by social reformers, intellectuals, and medical authorities from one end of the 
political spectrum to the other). 
 90 See generally  PAUL LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 45 (2008). 
 91 Robert J. Cynkar, C o m m e n t ,  Buck v. Bell: ‘Felt Necessities’ v. Fundamental 
Values?, 81 COLUM. L.  REV. 1418, 1432 (1981). 
 92 See Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: Providing 
Redress for the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
862, 862–63 (2004). 
 93 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 94 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that compulsory sterilization 
could not be imposed as a punishment for a crime, on the ground that the relevant Oklahoma 
law excluded white-collar crimes from carrying sterilization penalties). 
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safe to discharge a patient unless the “danger of procreation” could be eliminated.95 
Compulsory sterilization was also practiced in a range of countries across Europe, 
Scandinavia, and South America.96 In China, eugenic theories were embraced during 
the Republican period and also under the Communist Party.97   
Many people assume that compulsory sterilization has now been eradicated, at 
least in civilized nations that purport to comply with international human rights 
norms.98  In reality, persons with disabilities (particularly women and girls) continue 
to be sterilized in many parts of the world.99  Moreover, the question of whether 
sterilization is ethical continues to be debated by governments, lawyers, doctors, and 
family members, who often argue that sterilization is in the “best interests” of an 
individual living with a disability.100  Interestingly, in Australia, a recent 
parliamentary inquiry documented many abuses associated with the practice but 
nonetheless stopped short of recommending a complete ban on the practice of 
sterilizing a person because of a disability.101   
In light of this history, it is important for society to consider whether, and under 
what circumstances, the modern law of abortion may represent a form of eugenics. It 
would be uncontroversial to categorize a law as “eugenic” if it required pregnant 
women to undergo prenatal testing and to terminate a pregnancy where there is 
evidence of a fetal impairment.102 However, no state in the United States would enact 
such a law today; moreover, if any state did so, the law would certainly be found 
unconstitutional.103 The more relevant and complex question is whether society 
                                                          
 95 See Kristen Savel, Sex and the Sacred: Sterilisation and Bodily Integrity in English 
and Canadian Law, 49 MCGILL L.J. 1093, 1114 (2004) (citing the Sexual Sterilisation Acts of 
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 96 See Dikotter, supra note 89, at 468. 
 97 See generally FRANK DIKOTTER, IMPERFECT CONCEPTIONS: MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE, 
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pursues eugenics when it makes prenatal testing readily available and then allows 
each woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy if she receives a diagnosis 
of fetal impairment. In that case, the decision to abort does not necessarily reflect a 
societal policy of trying to prevent the birth of persons with disabilities.  Rather, it 
might reflect compassion for the pregnant woman, respect for her right to physical 
autonomy, or recognition that she is in the best position to determine whether she 
should continue the pregnancy. 
However, many disability rights scholars and activists would argue that society 
does not simply allow pregnant women to make their own decisions.104  Instead, the 
medical profession and other powerful institutions actively encourage disability-
selective abortion by recommending genetic screening and prenatal testing and then 
counseling prospective parents in a manner that discourages them from continuing a 
pregnancy if the tests reveal fetal impairment.105 In 2007, the American College of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology amended its guidelines to recommend that all pregnant 
women (rather than just women over the age of 35) should be offered prenatal 
chromosomal screening and, if warranted by the screening, prenatal diagnostic 
testing.106  In doing so, this professional body has arguably helped to expand and 
“normalize” the termination of pregnancies with genetic anomalies.107  Officially, the 
purpose of expanding genetic screening and prenatal testing is not to pressure 
pregnant women or even to suggest that they should have an abortion after receiving 
a diagnosis of fetal impairment.108 Rather, the stated purpose is simply to “prepare” 
prospective parents for the possibility that the child will have a disability and allow 
women to make informed choices.109  But as there is no “cure” for chromosomal 
disorders, the unspoken message is always there: by recommending screening and/or 
testing, the doctors are providing prospective parents an opportunity to abort a fetus 
deemed to be genetically imperfect.110  From the perspective of disability rights 
activists, the inevitable discursive effect of these targeted screening programs is to 
“convey the devaluation of the lives of persons with disabilities.”111 
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The medical profession’s tacit support of disability-selective abortion is also 
evident in the Opinion of the Ethics Committee of the American College of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, which provides that it is generally unethical for a doctor 
to facilitate sex selection except where the purpose is to prevent the birth of a child 
with a sex-linked hereditary disease.112  In other words, helping prospective parents 
to prevent the birth of a girl is inherently unethical, while helping parents to prevent 
the birth of child with a disability is perfectly ethical.  Many doctors would not see 
the potential for discrimination in this position because they have traditionally 
adopted a medical view of disability and impairment.113  As one commentator stated 
in 1999: 
When physicians, public health experts, and bioethicists promote prenatal 
diagnosis to prevent future disability, they let disability become the only 
relevant characteristic and suggest that it is such a problematic 
characteristic that people eagerly awaiting a new baby should terminate 
the pregnancy and “try again” for a healthy child. Professionals fail to 
recognize that along with whatever impairment may be diagnosed come 
all the characteristics of any other future child. The health professions 
suggest that once a prospective parent knows of the likely disability of a 
future child, there is nothing else to know or imagine about who the child 
might become: disability subverts parental dreams.114  
 This purely medical approach to disability is evident in the “quality of life” 
assessments given to pregnant women when they receive a diagnosis of fetal 
impairment.  Traditionally, these assessments are provided by doctors, who may pass 
on harmful stereotypes to prospective parents regarding the expected quality of life 
of a child with a disability.115  This is not to suggest that parents should not have 
access to medical information. Certain impairments cause significant physical pain 
and suffering, and prospective parents have a right to know this.116  However, 
doctors are not experts on the overall quality of life of persons living with 
disabilities.117  Rather, individuals living with the impairment, or their families, are 
better qualified to offer an opinion on the expected quality of life of a future child.118 
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In recent decades, the United States has enacted extensive legislation to promote 
the rights of persons with disabilities, including the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA)119 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).120  One might 
hope that these laws (and the disability rights movement generally) would help to 
counter the purely medical view of disability, giving doctors and prospective parents 
a less negative view of the prospect of raising a child with an impairment.  In theory, 
laws that prohibit disability discrimination and require inclusive education should 
enhance the expected quality of life of children with disabilities and, thus, increase 
the likelihood that a woman would decide to continue her pregnancy after receiving 
a diagnosis of fetal impairment.121  However, a 2012 study of the portrayal of 
prenatal testing in American newspapers concluded that disability is still portrayed 
primarily as a negative quality and that termination of a fetus with an impairment is 
often presented as “a matter of fact issue, with little regard to the controversy that 
might be embedded in such a position.”122   
This may indicate that laws prohibiting disability discrimination have failed to 
fundamentally change society’s view of disability or to reassure prospective parents 
that a child born with an impairment can have a high quality of life.  Indeed, one 
theory is that laws prohibiting disability discrimination may have done the opposite 
by bringing more public attention to the discrimination that is still prevalent in 
society and the challenges that parents will face when rearing children with 
disabilities.123  For example, it is well known that many parents are dissatisfied with 
public schools’ compliance with the IDEA legislation and have felt compelled to file 
complaints, spawning a good deal of litigation and an entire specialty within the field 
of alternative dispute resolution.124   
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Public awareness of these disputes regarding inclusive education may make 
prospective parents wonder whether they can effectively advocate for a child with a 
disability, increasing the pressure that a pregnant woman feels when she receives a 
diagnosis of fetal impairment. She may even feel a duty to terminate her pregnancy, 
so as not to bring a child into the world who may require a larger share of resources 
from society than a “normal” child would require.125 In this manner, eugenic 
perspectives can be conveyed to prospective parents without overt coercion, or even 
an official policy of encouraging disability-selective abortions.126  
Moreover, in many jurisdictions, encouraging “eugenic abortions” is more than 
just an implied message.  Rather, it is arguably an official policy – because the law 
makes it easier to legally terminate a pregnancy where there is evidence of fetal 
impairment. For example, the state of Utah enacted a ban on post-viability abortions 
but made an exception for cases of “fetal abnormality.”127 Apparently, the legislators 
who approved that exception decided that the state has less of an interest in 
protecting fetal life when the future child is likely to be born with a disability.128  The 
influence of eugenic thinking can also be inferred from state laws that prohibit public 
funding for abortion but, once again, make an exception where prenatal testing has 
revealed a fetal impairment.129  
An official policy of encouraging disability-selective abortions is particularly 
evident in jurisdictions that do not recognize a woman’s “right” to an abortion at any 
stage of pregnancy but, instead, approach abortion from a public policy perspective 
and permit the termination of pregnancies based on evidence of fetal impairment.130  
A leading example of this approach is the United Kingdom, which has in turn 
influenced the laws of former British colonies.131 When the United Kingdom’s law 
prohibiting abortion was first liberalized in 1967, Parliament chose not to recognize 
a “right” to access abortion;132 rather, it created certain exceptions to the criminal 
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prohibitions on abortion.133  As enacted, the 1967 Act provided that a person would 
not be guilty of an offense if two registered medical practitioners were of the 
opinion, formed in good faith:  
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of 
the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the 
pregnancy were terminated; or 
 
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer 
from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously 
handicapped.134 
Thus, a woman carrying a “normal” fetus would be required to demonstrate that 
the pregnancy presented some sort of danger to her physical or mental health or to 
that of her family. In contrast, Parliament assumed that a substantial risk that the 
future child would be “seriously handicapped” would justify terminating a 
pregnancy, without any need to demonstrate a negative impact on the pregnant 
woman or her family.135  It has been suggested that Parliament enacted this clause in 
response to the disabilities caused by thalidomide, a medication once prescribed for 
pregnant women in the United Kingdom which was later discovered to cause severe 
impairments in their unborn children.136  Interestingly, however, Parliament did not 
limit the exemption to particular impairments or make any effort to define, in the 
statute, what impairments would be considered sufficiently serious to justify an 
abortion.137 That decision was left to the discretion of the woman requesting the 
abortion and the two certifying doctors.138  This means that the statute can be relied 
upon to terminate a pregnancy even when the impairment is not considered 
incompatible with a full life.139  
The time limits for abortion under British law are also revealing. Although the 
1967 Act set the legal limit for most abortions at 28 weeks, this was reduced to 24 
weeks in 1990 because it was recognized that premature babies can survive if born at 
24 weeks.140   But the 24-week time limit was only applied to abortions sought on the 
broad ground that the pregnancy endangers the physical or mental health of a 
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pregnant woman or her family.141  The law permits an abortion much later in 
pregnancy if it threatens the woman’s life or is likely to cause “grave permanent 
injury” to her physical or mental health.142 Late-term abortions are also permitted 
where “there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.143 Indeed, assuming 
that the woman finds two doctors who are willing to approve it, an abortion could 
legally be performed on the basis of “abnormality” right up through the ninth month 
of pregnancy.   
This aspect of British abortion law is controversial among certain members of 
Parliament and their constituents, generating a Parliamentary Inquiry to review the 
statutory provision that allows abortion on the basis of disability up until birth.144 
The findings were published in 2013 and noted, in the summary, that the “majority 
of those in medical bodies and involved in fetal medicine strongly argued that the 
law is right for the small number of difficult cases where parents face a late 
discovery of the child’s disability” and that the law does not affect public attitudes 
towards persons with disabilities.145 However, a majority of those who made 
submissions felt otherwise and the report recommended that “[i]f the time limit for 
abortions on the grounds of disability remains to birth, there should be additional 
written justification for abortions on the grounds of disability after 24 weeks, which 
should be subject to audit.”146  
 This report does not necessarily indicate the views of Parliament generally147 and 
it is presently unclear whether the law will be changed.  Moreover, even if the 
recommended amendment is made, British law will still include “serious handicap” 
as an express and distinct ground for abortion, giving the law a decidedly eugenic 
tone. The public commentary on the Parliamentary Inquiry indicates that British pro-
choice organizations were not moved by the testimony of those who feel that the 
current British abortion law discriminates based on disability.148  Similarly, Marsha 
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Saxton of the World Institute on Disability (who has written extensively on the need 
for greater communication between feminists and disability rights activists) has 
observed that American pro-choice feminists (and American society generally) have 
traditionally been isolated from persons with disabilities, making it difficult to fully 
appreciate their perspectives on abortion.149 The other challenge to communication is 
that pro-choice organizations genuinely feel that access to safe and legal abortion 
services is tenuous, particularly in countries like the United Kingdom, where access 
to abortion has not been established as a constitutional right and thus could be taken 
away through the ordinary legal process.150 As a result, feminists may feel that it is 
simply too dangerous to support any new restrictions on the legal grounds for 
terminating a pregnancy.151   
Comparative research on access to abortion helps to illustrate this point.  
According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, approximately 60 countries now 
permit women to terminate a pregnancy, at least during early pregnancy, without 
regard to the reason for termination.152  However, twice that number (approximately 
125 countries) maintain very restrictive abortion laws.153 Approximately 30 countries 
have liberalized their abortion laws in the past two decades.154  But this does not 
necessarily mean that these 30 countries now recognize that a woman has a “right” 
to abortion.  Rather, many countries have followed an approach that is conceptually 
similar to the British Parliament’s approach in 1967 – maintaining the general 
prohibition on abortion but permitting pregnancy termination in certain 
“exceptional” situations, including fetal impairment.155 From the perspective of pro-
choice feminists, this is not ideal because they would prefer that women have an 
unqualified right to choose whether to continue a pregnancy.156  However, if a 
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national legislature is not willing to recognize a “right” to abortion, then most pro-
choice feminists will probably support exceptions to the laws that criminalize 
abortion, including exceptions based upon fetal impairment.157  From their 
perspective, even if these statutory exceptions reflect a eugenic tone, they are worth 
maintaining because they help a certain number of women to avoid illegal and 
unsafe abortions.158  
As demonstrated in the next section of the article, international human rights law 
and the bodies that monitor compliance with human rights treaties have largely taken 
a similarly pragmatic approach to abortion and law reform.  However, the 
introduction of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities raises new 
issues and requires us to reconsider this approach to issues of reproductive justice. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND ACCESS TO ABORTION: 
EMERGING NORMS AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES   
Women’s advocacy groups have long argued that access to reproductive health 
services (including contraception and safe legal abortion) are an integral component 
of women’s rights under international human rights law.159 However, the question of 
whether there is a right to abortion under international law continues to be contested. 
Subsection A briefly summarizes both sides of the debate and Subsection B 
analyzes, in greater detail, what the CRPD, which came into force in 2008, has 
added to the analysis. Subsection C then explores the approach that the Committee 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has taken thus far, using its review of the 
Initial Reports of Spain and Hungary under the CRPD as examples.  
 A.  The Emerging “Right” to Abortion in International Law   
Those who argue that there is no right to abortion in international law principally 
rely on three general arguments: (1) the fetus has a right to life which should be 
protected; (2) none of the core UN human rights treaties expressly mention a right to 
terminate a pregnancy; and (3) international courts and treaty-monitoring bodies 
should not interpret other rights (such as women’s right to life, health, bodily 
integrity, or equality) as requiring states to legalize abortion or provide access to 
abortion services.160   
Opponents of abortion have, however, largely lost the first argument.  The core 
UN human rights treaties simply do not recognize a fetus as a “human” or endow the 
fetus with rights under international law.161  This is a general principle,162 one that is 
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consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which provides 
that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”163  During the 
drafting of the ICCPR (one of the two treaties that translated the UDHR into binding 
treaty form), proposals to protect the right to life from the moment of conception 
were considered but ultimately rejected.164  The question of fetal rights was raised 
again during the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).165 The 
preamble to the CRC states that “the child, by reason of his physical and mental 
immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth,” and this language arguably implies that the 
term “child” includes an unborn fetus.166  However, Article 1 of the CRC provides 
the legal definition of “child” for purposes of the Convention, stating that “a child 
means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”167  Thus, it is generally agreed 
that the enforceable provisions of the CRC “retain the historical understanding that 
legally protected status as a human being begins at live birth.”168 
On the other hand, those who argue against a right to abortion under international 
law can easily win the second argument because the core UN human rights treaties 
also do not expressly recognize a “right” to abortion.169  Indeed, advocates for 
women’s reproductive autonomy have frequently conceded that point.170  The 
CEDAW treaty comes the closest to providing an express right to control one’s 
fertility, stating in Article 16, that:  
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and 
family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of 
men and women, the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the 
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the 
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these 
rights.171   
On its face, this article appears to primarily focus on a woman’s right to an equal 
decision-making role within her marriage and in the family.  And while one can 
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easily infer a right to control one’s fertility from this provision, it still does not 
expressly mention abortion.  Thus, while the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women regularly recommends that governments relax 
restrictions on abortion,172 the Committee does not try to argue that governments are 
obligated to recognize a general “right” to abortion because of Article 16.  Indeed, it 
probably would be counterproductive to do so because many countries have already 
filed reservations to Article 16, and the CEDAW Committee would like to see 
governments withdraw those reservations.173  
Thus, the debate regarding an emerging right to abortion in international human 
rights law essentially boils down to the third issue – whether such a right is implicit 
in other rights that are stated in the core UN human rights treaties.  Here, the 
advocates for reproductive justice have made significant progress in recent years, 
relying upon a variety of provisions in the core UN human rights treaties, including 
those that protect women’s rights to life, health, freedom from discrimination, 
autonomy in reproductive decision-making, and freedom from cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment.174  In general, the UN agencies and human rights treaty-
monitoring bodies have been receptive to this approach.175  As a result, there is now 
a body of international jurisprudence that recognizes certain reproductive rights, 
including the right to be free from unlawful state intrusion (e.g. forced abortions or 
sterilization) and the right to access certain reproductive health services, including 
contraception, maternal health services, and, where necessary, abortion.176 
For example, the UN Human Rights Committee (which monitors the ICCPR, a 
treaty that was ratified by the United States in 1992) recognizes that laws that block 
access to safe and legal abortions may violate women’s right to life.177  This is a 
credible argument, given that thousands of women die annually from unsafe 
abortions.178  The Human Rights Committee has thus requested that governments 
inform it of “any measures taken by the State to help women prevent unwanted 
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pregnancies, and to ensure that they do not have to undergo life-threatening 
clandestine abortions.”179 The Human Rights Committee has also criticized 
governments that maintain a general ban on abortion or that make accessing abortion 
so difficult that women feel compelled to seek an illegal and unsafe abortion.180  
It has also been recognized that overly restrictive abortion laws can lead to 
violations of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,181 
arising either from the need to resort to an unsafe abortion or from being forced to 
carry a pregnancy to term.  For example, the Committee Against Torture, the treaty-
monitoring body for the CAT, observed that a woman who is compelled to continue 
a pregnancy after rape experiences “constant exposure to the violation committed 
against her,” which can lead to traumatic stress and long-lasting psychological 
problems.182 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights held that a woman who 
could not obtain an abortion in a case of severe fetal impairment “suffered acute 
anguish through having to think about how she and her family would be able to 
ensure the child’s welfare, happiness and appropriate long-term medical care.”183 
Human rights treaty bodies have also analyzed abortion in the context of the right 
to non-discrimination. Both the ICCPR and the CEDAW obligate states to prohibit 
discrimination against women,184 which is defined (in the CEDAW treaty) as 
including laws and policies that have the “purpose or effect” of preventing a woman 
from exercising any of her human rights or fundamental freedoms on a basis of 
equality with men.185 The Human Rights Committee has recognized that an absolute 
prohibition on abortion, even in cases of rape, violates the state’s obligation to 
ensure that women enjoy equal civil and political rights.186 Criminalizing abortion 
constitutes discrimination in health care because it is a procedure that is needed only 
by women and because forced pregnancy and childbirth expose women to gender-
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specific health risks.187 The potential impact of being legally compelled to continue a 
pregnancy was illustrated in L.C. v. Peru, a communication brought under the 
CEDAW Optional Protocol.188 A teenager became pregnant as a result of sexual 
abuse and attempted to commit suicide by jumping from a tall building.189  She 
required emergency surgery to address the injury to her spine and alleged that the 
public hospital declined to perform the surgery because it posed a risk to the 
pregnancy.190 The hospital also refused to perform an abortion, despite the fact that 
“therapeutic abortion” was supposed to be legal in Peru and the pregnancy posed a 
danger to L.C.’s physical and mental health.191  The surgery was not performed until 
three months later (after L.C. had spontaneously miscarried) and L.C. alleged that 
the delay caused her paralysis.192  The CEDAW Committee decided that the refusal 
to terminate the pregnancy and perform the necessary surgery in a timely manner 
constituted a violation of Articles 2(c) and (f), 3, 5, and 12, together with Article 1 of 
the CEDAW treaty.193   
More recently, the CEDAW Committee submitted a statement on sexual and 
reproductive rights to the International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) Beyond 2014 Review.194  Although the statement devotes only one full 
paragraph to abortion, it takes a clear position, noting that “unsafe abortion is a 
leading cause of maternal mortality and morbidity” and that states should therefore 
“legalize abortion at least in cases of rape, incest, threats to the life and/or health of 
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the mother, or severe fetal impairment,” as well as removing punitive measures for 
women who undergo abortion.195 
The summary provided above is just a small sample of the many occasions in 
which the core UN human rights treaty-monitoring bodies have recognized that 
denying a woman access to an abortion when she requests one could constitute a 
violation of her rights under international law. These statements by the treaty bodies 
(generally given in the course of Concluding Observations on governments’ periodic 
reports or in decisions on individual communications) are not, strictly speaking, 
binding on all States Parties to the relevant treaties.196  However, the opinions of the 
treaty-monitoring bodies are considered highly authoritative interpretations197 and it 
is clear that the advocates for reproductive freedom are gaining ground in the 
jurisprudence of international human rights.198   
The next subsection considers the approach taken in the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is longer and far more detailed than 
previous human rights treaties and has several articles that are relevant to the right to 
life, the right to create a family, and the right to reproductive health services.  
B.  The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
The CRPD is considered historic because it rejects the outdated medical and 
social welfare approaches to disability.199  Instead, the CRPD provides legal 
authority for the social and human rights models of disability.200  The social model is 
a generic term for a theory of disability that was developed in the 1960s by British 
activists advocating for the right to live independently.201 It distinguishes between 
                                                          
 195 Id. 
 196 Univ. Bristol & Arts & Humanities Research Council, Implementation of UN Treaty 
Body Concluding Observations: The Role of National and Regional Mechanisms in Europe, 
UNHR.ORG (Sept. 20 2011), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/Summary_Proceedings_Bristol_Sept2011_
24.10.2011.pdf. 
 197 See Opening address by Ms Navi Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 
Informal meeting, Intergovernmental process on the strengthening of the Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, July 16, 2012, United Nations Headquarters, New York, at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12361&LangID=e
; and Navanethem Pillay, STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
BODY SYSTEM: A REPORT BY THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
(June 2012), at Foreword and p. 82. 
 198 Isfahan Merali, Advancing Women's Reproductive and Sexual Health Rights: Using the 
International Human Rights System, 10 DEV. IN PRAC. 609, 614–20 (2010).  
 199 Mary Crock, Ron McCallum & Christine Ernst, Where Disability and Displacement 
Intersect: Asylum Seekers with Disabilities, 24 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 735, 735 (Sept. 2011). The 
medical model focused on individual “afflictions” and the need for treatment, while the 
welfare model focused on the need to protect and support “disabled” individuals.  Id.  
 200 Michael Palmer & David Harley, Models and Measurement in Disability: An 
International Review, 27 HEALTH POL’Y PLAN. 357, 359 (2011).   
 201 See Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, CTR. DISABILITY STUDIES 
(amended Sept. 8, 1976), http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/UPIAS-UPIAS.pdf; 
see also Vic Finkelstein, The Social Model of Disability Repossessed, Coalition, CTR. 
 
150 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 28:121 
 
impairments and disability, which it defines as a form of social oppression that is 
perpetuated by physical and social barriers.202 The human rights model is similar to 
the social model in that it views people who live with impairments as rights holders 
and recognizes that they are often more disabled by physical and attitudinal barriers 
than by individual impairments.203 However, the human rights model expressly 
includes economic, social, and cultural rights (what some scholars refer to as 
“second generation rights”), which are necessary for many persons to live with 
dignity and achieve equality.204  
The CRPD is also historic because of the manner in which it was drafted. 
Traditionally, new treaties have been drafted primarily by diplomats during closed-
door meetings.205  In the case of the CRPD, there was an unusually high level of 
input from civil society, far exceeding that for previous human rights treaties.206  
This was largely because the disability rights movement insisted on the right to 
participate.207 Governments were urged to appoint citizens with disabilities to the 
official delegations and to actively consult disability rights organizations.208 Activists 
also organized at the local and regional levels and submitted written comments to the 
Ad Hoc Committee that drafted the treaty.209 The large number of submissions 
generated vigorous debates on the language of the CRPD.210 
                                                          
DISABILITY STUDIES (Dec. 1, 2002), available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuk/finkelstein/soc%20mod%20repossessed.pdf. 
 202 Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, supra note 201. 
 203 See Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 287, 291 (2007); 
Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness Into Light? Introducing the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008).   
 204 See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75, 93 (2007) 
(discussing the shortcomings of the social model and the importance of including economic 
and social rights in the “disability human rights” model). 
 205 Katherine Guernsey, Marcolo Nicoli & Alberto Ninio, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEVANCE FOR THE WORLD BANK 1 
(2007).   
 206 See HUMAN RIGHTS & DISABILITY ADVOCACY 5 (Maya Sabatello & Marianne Schulze, 
eds. 2014); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Hails Adoption of Landmark 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities , U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10797 (Dec. 13, 
2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sgsm10797.doc.htm (describing 
the CRPD as the first human rights treaty to emerge from lobbying conducted extensively 
through the internet). 
 207 Jerry Alan Winter, The Development of the Disability Rights Movement as a Social 
Problem Solver, 23 DISABILITIES STUD. Q. 33, 46 (2003).   
 208 Tara J. Melish, Perspectives on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The UN CRPD: 
Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 
37 (2007). 
 209 Nicholas Caivano, Conceptualizing Capacity: Interpreting Canada’s Qualified 
Ratification of Article 12 of the UN Disability Rights Convention, 4 W. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 
(2014). 
 210 See id. at 2; see also UNITEDNATIONSENABLE.ORG, 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1423 (last visited Oct. 18, 2014) (providing 
 
2015] ABORTION ON THE BASIS OF FETAL IMPAIRMENT 151 
 
One of these debates was on the question of whether and how to define disability. 
Some argued that any definition that employed medical terminology would 
undermine the treaty’s commitment to the social model.211  Others argued for a 
detailed definition out of fear that persons with certain types of disabilities might 
otherwise be excluded from national laws that purported to implement the treaty.212  
The final version of the CRPD reflects a compromise. Although “disability” is not 
defined in the definitions section of the treaty, Article One states that the purpose of 
the CRPD is to “promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities” and that 
“[p]ersons with disabilities include those with long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which, in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others.”213  Thus, while the treaty expressly includes certain groups, it does not 
purport to define the full scope of the term “persons with disabilities,” leaving the 
issue to be determined through activism and the continuing efforts of the disability 
rights movement.214 It also emphasizes the core principle of the social model, that it 
is not simply “impairments” that create disability but the manner in which socially 
constructed barriers interact with individual conditions.215  
In light of the history of eugenic policies, it is not surprising that the CRPD 
specifically addresses issues relating to the rights to life, marriage, and reproduction.  
Three Articles are particularly relevant. Article 10 affirms that every human being 
has the inherent right to life, and obligates States Parties to take all necessary 
measures to ensure the effective enjoyment by persons with disabilities on an equal 
basis with others.216 Article 23 obligates States Parties to take steps to “eliminate 
discrimination against persons with disabilities in all matters relating to marriage, 
family, parenthood and relationships” and strongly condemns any form of state-
sponsored sterilization, providing that persons with disabilities “shall retain their 
fertility.”217 Article 25, which provides for the right to health, expressly requires 
States Parties to provide persons with disabilities equal access to sexual and 
reproductive health services.218 In particular, Article 25 states that persons with 
disabilities should be provided “with the same range, quality and standard of free or 
affordable health care and programmes as provided to other persons, including in the 
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area of sexual and reproductive health and population-based public health 
programmes.”219  
The records of the Ad Hoc Committee that drafted the CRPD highlight the 
competing views on the appropriate wording of these articles and demonstrate that 
access to sexual and reproductive health services was a particularly contentious 
issue.220  As a result, the language was substantially revised from the first draft, so as 
to become “far less explicit and affirmative” regarding sexuality. 221 The Holy See, 
which has observer status at the United Nations, played a significant role in this 
process; for example, it objected to any language referring to “sexual and 
reproductive health” services on the ground that some countries would include 
abortion services within this broad category.222  
The Holy See was not entirely alone in its concern that abortion services could be 
conflated with a general right to sexual and reproductive health. Other participants in 
the drafting process were also deeply concerned by the phenomena of disability-
selective abortion.223 Approximately halfway through the drafting process, a working 
group submitted a proposal for the text of the draft of Article 8 on the “right to 
life”.224  That draft expressly stated that “[d]isability is not a justification for the 
termination of life” and that States Parties to the treaty “shall undertake effective 
measures to the prohibition of compulsory abortion at the instance of the State based 
on the prenatal diagnosis of disability.”225 However, this language did not make it 
into the final version of the treaty.226  Although the working group stressed that it 
was not seeking to reduce the freedom of women to make their own decisions, the 
proposed language stating that, “disability should not be a justification for the 
termination of life,” raised concerns among many participants who supported 
women’s right to choose.227  
Some of the groups that commented on the drafts of the CRPD thus sought to 
find language that would represent a compromise: a way to preserve a woman’s right 
to reproductive freedom, while also creating a state obligation to prevent compulsory 
abortion and a minimal duty to encourage prospective parents not to terminate a 
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pregnancy solely because of disability.228 A coalition of Australian disability rights 
groups put forth the following suggestion: 
This [issue] obviously presents a difficult ethical challenge, not least 
because of its potential impact on the choice of women in relation to 
pregnancy. However, it might be possible to address this issue more 
indirectly. For example, much of the information that is made available to 
parents at the time of genetic testing and immediately following the birth 
of a child with disability is overwhelmingly negative and inaccurate, and 
induces parents to opt for termination of pregnancy or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatments.  It is possible to impose an obligation on States to 
ensure that prospective parents of a child with disability receive positive 
and realistic orientation to their child and its future life. This may reduce 
the chances that parents will opt for termination of pregnancy.229 
Ultimately, however, the drafters of the CRPD agreed to describe the “right to 
life” in very simple terms. The provision on the “right to life” (which is numbered 
Article 10 in the final version of the CRPD) does not refer to “the unborn” and it 
does not state that life begins at conception.230 Nor does it impose even a minimal 
obligation on governments to provide prospective parents with a positive view of the 
prospect of raising a child with a disability. This decision can be explained by the 
concern that any language referring to the status of the unborn or the procedures that 
should be followed before a pregnant woman can obtain an abortion would have 
opened a “Pandora’s box,” one that would have been extremely difficult to close 
because abortion is such a divisive topic.231 As such, the drafters decided against 
including any express reference to abortion within the treaty.232  
The drafters did, however, retain the language relating to the right of persons 
with disabilities to access reproductive health services in Article 25.233 The right to 
decide on the number and spacing of children, first stated in Article 16 of the 
CEDAW treaty, also appears in Article 23 of the CRPD.234  Indeed, the language is 
arguably stronger in the CRPD, as it provides that States Parties should ensure that: 
“The rights of persons with disabilities to decide freely and responsibly on the 
number and spacing of their children and to have access to age-appropriate 
information, reproductive and family planning education are recognized, and the 
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means necessary to enable them to exercise these rights are provided.”235 This is 
important because, contrary to stereotypes, persons with disabilities have active 
sexual lives.236 Moreover, sexually active women who are capable of becoming 
pregnant generally want the ability to control their fertility at certain stages in their 
lives.237 The Holy See responded to these drafting decisions by declining to sign the 
CRPD.238  Although it had originally been a strong supporter of the idea of a treaty 
on the rights of persons with disabilities, the Holy See was unwilling to sign a 
document that might be interpreted as supporting a right to access contraception or 
abortion services.239 
The debate on whether the CRPD obligates states to change their laws regarding 
abortion did not end with the drafting process. As discussed in the next subsection, 
this debate has reemerged during the international reporting process, the primary 
enforcement process for the CRPD and for the other core UN human rights treaties.  
C.    The Approach of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to 
Abortion on the Ground of Fetal Impairment 
The international reporting process for the CRPD is overseen by the Committee 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a panel of independent experts on 
disability rights from around the world who serve in their personal capacity.240 When 
a state ratifies the CRPD, its national government is obligated to submit a 
comprehensive “Initial Report” of its implementation of the treaty within two years 
of becoming a State Party.241 The Initial Report is intended to describe both the 
progress toward implementation and any barriers preventing full compliance with 
the treaty.242 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often provide input as the 
Committee prepares its “List of Issues,” an official document seeking supplementary 
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information from the State Party on topics that were not included in the Initial 
Report or which the Committee believes were not adequately addressed.243  
NGOs also regularly submit “alternative” or “shadow reports” that comment on 
the official report and point out governmental failures to comply with the treaty.244  
When all of this documentation has been submitted, and usually published on the 
Committee’s website, the Committee conducts a formal public review of the state’s 
Initial Report and issues “Concluding Observations,” advising the government of its 
concerns and suggestions for implementation of the treaty.245 The process is 
essentially a dialogue between the Committee and the government delegation 
representing the State Party. As such, the Committee is careful to phrase its 
recommendations in diplomatic language. Although the Committee cannot compel a 
government to comply with its recommendations, civil society can use the 
Concluding Observations to lobby for law and policy reforms at the domestic 
level.246  
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities commenced operations 
in 2008, shortly after the CRPD received its twentieth ratification and entered into 
force as a binding multilateral treaty.247 Spain’s Initial Report on the implementation 
of the CRPD was submitted in 2010 and it became the second state report reviewed 
by the Committee.248 Spain serves as an illustrative case study of the potential impact 
of the CRPD reporting process, partly because the Spanish government attempted to 
reduce women’s access to legal abortion soon after the Committee’ review of 
Spain’s Initial Report. 
In 1985, Spain legalized abortion under certain circumstances, including fetal 
impairment.249 In 2009, under the rule of the Socialist Party, the government 
conducted a review of the abortion law.  This process led to a more liberal legislative 
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framework, which was enacted in 2010.250  Under Article 14 of the 2010 law, which 
is still in force, a pregnancy can be lawfully terminated within the first fourteen 
weeks at the request of the pregnant woman, provided that she receives counseling, 
pursuant to Articles 17(2) and 17(4), and waits at least three days after counseling 
before having the abortion.251  It is estimated that 90% of all abortions since 2012 
have been conducted under this provision, within the first 14 weeks of pregnancy.252  
However, Article 15 of the 2010 law, entitled “Termination on Health Grounds” 
provides that a pregnancy can also be terminated for “medical reasons” later in 
pregnancy, under any one of the following circumstances: 
(a) Prior to the twenty-second week of pregnancy, if the woman’s life or 
health is in serious risk, as confirmed in advance by a medical 
specialist not performing or supervising the procedure. Confirmation 
will not be required in emergency cases of immediately life-
threatening risk. 
 
(b) Prior to the twenty-second week of pregnancy, provided that there is 
a risk of serious fetal anomalies, as confirmed in advance by two 
medical specialists not performing or supervising the procedure. 
 
(c) In case of fetal anomalies incompatible with life as confirmed in 
advance by a medical specialist not performing or supervising the 
procedure, or when the fetus is found to suffer from an extremely 
serious condition that is incurable at the time of diagnosis, as 
confirmed by a Medical Committee.253 
Thus, under the 2010 law, a “risk of serious fetal anomalies” automatically 
extends the period of lawful abortion by an additional eight weeks. Moreover, an 
abortion can legally be performed at any time during the pregnancy if the Medical 
Committee confirms that “the fetus . . . suffer[s] from an extremely serious condition 
that is incurable at the time of diagnosis.”254   
Although the Spanish government was drafting its Initial Report to the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities at approximately the same time 
that it enacted the 2010 abortion law, its Initial Report under the CRPD did not 
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mention the ongoing reforms to Spain’s abortion law.255  Nor did Spain’s Initial 
Report mention the exception for abortion on the ground of fetal impairment, 
although this had been part of Spanish law since 1985.256 The issue was, however, 
raised by the Comité Español de Representantes de Personas con Discapacidad, an 
NGO appointed by the Spanish government as an independent monitoring body to 
promote implementation of the CRPD.257 Its alternative report to the Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities highlighted the 2010 law on abortion and 
used the term “eugenic abortion” to describe abortions that are authorized on the 
basis of fetal impairment.258  
This alternative report was reviewed by the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, which then used the “List of Issues” mechanism to obtain more 
information, asking the Spanish government to:  
[P]rovide information on the new Organic Act 2/2010 of 3 March 2010 on 
sexual and reproductive health and the voluntary termination of 
pregnancy, in particular the longer time limits allowed for terminating 
pregnancies when the fetus has a disability. Does the Government of 
Spain consider this to be in line with [A]rticle 4, paragraph 1(d), of the 
Convention?259 
 It is noteworthy that the Committee did not request this information under the 
heading of Article 10, which provides for the right to life, but does not refer to the 
unborn and, as discussed above, does not address the issue of disability-selective 
abortion.260 Rather, the Committee asked for the information under the heading of 
Article 4, which describes “general obligations” of the countries that ratify the 
CRPD.261 In particular, Article 4 obligates States Parties to “undertake to ensure and 
promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of 
disability”262 and “to refrain from engaging in any act or practice that is inconsistent 
with the present Convention and to ensure that public authorities and institutions act 
in conformity with the present Convention.”263 Thus, the Committee implicitly 
categorized a law that makes it easier to terminate a pregnancy in cases of fetal 
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impairment as discriminatory, despite the absence of any reference to the unborn as 
“rights holders” under the treaty.  
In its response, the Spanish government confirmed that an abortion could be 
lawfully performed much later in pregnancy in cases of fetal impairment, but also 
explained that a woman would have access to support services if she decided to 
continue the pregnancy.264 The Spanish government also reminded the Committee 
that the CRPD does not require a government to protect life before birth.265 
Consistent with previous international law and practice, Article 10 of the CRPD is 
silent on the issue, leaving each state to determine when life begins according to its 
own constitution and legal principles.266  However, in the eyes of the Committee 
members, this was apparently irrelevant -- because it was not seeking information 
regarding the legality of abortion generally but rather regarding the differential 
treatment of pregnancies on the basis of fetal impairment.  
During the public hearing on Spain’s Initial Report, a member of the Committee 
raised the issue again, asking why the legal period of abortion was longer in cases of 
fetal impairment.267 Not receiving a satisfactory answer, the Committee included the 
following statement in its Concluding Observations on Spain’s Initial Report: 
The Committee takes note of Act 2/2010 of 3 March 2010 on sexual and 
reproductive health, which decriminalizes voluntary termination of 
pregnancy, allows pregnancy to be terminated up to 14 weeks and 
includes two specific cases in which the time limits for abortion are 
extended if the foetus has a disability: until [twenty-two] weeks of 
gestation, provided there is “a risk of serious anomalies in the foetus”, and 
beyond week [twenty-two] when, inter alia, “an extremely serious and 
incurable illness is detected in the foetus”. The Committee also notes the 
explanations provided by the State party for maintaining this distinction. 
The Committee recommends that the State party abolish the distinction 
made in Act 2/2010 in the period allowed under law within which a 
pregnancy can be terminated based solely on disability.268 
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The following year, the Committee made similar comments on Hungary’s Initial 
Report.269 However, in some ways, the Committee’s comments to the Hungarian 
government were even stronger in that it expressly categorized a law that allows for 
abortions in cases of fetal impairment as a form of discrimination on the ground of 
disability, which is prohibited under Article 5 of the CRPD.270 The Committee 
expressed concern that Hungary’s law allows abortion “for a wider circle than in 
general for the fetuses deemed to have health damage or some disability, thereby 
discriminating on the basis of disability.”271 It appears that the Committee is 
implicitly taking the position that a fetus enjoys rights under the CRPD, despite the 
lack of any explicit statement to this effect in the treaty.272 If this is the case, the 
Committee’s approach marks a departure from the predominant approach in 
international law, which has traditionally not provided for fetal rights in human 
rights treaties but rather allowed each individual state to determine whether a fetus 
enjoys legal rights within that state’s domestic legal system.273 It should be noted that 
the right to non-discrimination is defined in the CRPD to include the right to 
reasonable accommodations; thus if a fetus does enjoy a right to non-discrimination 
under the CRPD then this would also include a right to receive reasonable 
accommodations by the State Party.274  In this author’s view, the only other possible 
interpretation of the Committee’s recommendation that Hungary abolish all 
distinctions based upon disability in its abortion law is that the Committee may 
believe that permitting abortion on the ground of fetal impairment devalues, and 
therefore discriminates against, people who are already living with disabilities. 
 Concerned that governments may interpret the Committee’s comments as an 
invitation to restrict access to abortion, reproductive rights advocates have criticized 
the Committee’s recommendations to Spain and Hungary. For example, in 2013, the 
Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR) submitted commentary to the Committee as 
part of its “half-day discussion” on women and girls with disabilities.275 The CRR 
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pointed out that the Committee’s comments to Spain and Hungary “could be 
interpreted to contravene” the approach that has been established by the other UN 
human rights treaty bodies, which has been to urge governments to liberalize 
abortion laws and reduce the incidence of illegal and unsafe abortions that contribute 
to maternal mortality.276  CRR also warned the Committee that “restricting women’s 
access to legal abortion services will not prevent them from seeking to terminate a 
pregnancy if they wish to do so; such restrictions will only force them to resort to 
clandestine and unsafe abortions, which may place their lives and health at risk.”277 
Recent events in Spain confirm that the CRR has good reason to be concerned by 
the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  
In 2013, the conservative Popular Party (PP), Spain’s current ruling party, proposed 
to enact a bill prohibiting abortion in most circumstances, including cases of fetal 
impairment. Although the bill was titled “Anteproyecto de ley orgánica para la 
protección de la vida del concebido y de los derechos de la mujer embarazada” 
(which can be translated to English as “for the protection of the life of the fetus and 
the rights of pregnant women”) the government’s bill leaned heavily toward 
protection of the fetus.278 Indeed, had it been enacted, the bill would have 
represented one of the most significant restrictions on abortion in Europe.279 First 
introduced in December 2013, the bill proposed to reinstate the general prohibition 
on abortion with only two exceptions: (1) abortion would be permitted up to twelve 
weeks if the pregnancy was the result of sexual violence which had been reported to 
the police; and (2) abortion would be permitted up to twenty-two weeks if two 
doctors confirmed that the pregnancy endangered the mother’s physical or mental 
health.280  As initially proposed, the government’s bill contained no exception for 
cases of fetal impairment.  While it is hard to assess the impact of the Concluding 
Observations by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the 
timing of the bill indicates that the Committee’s views may well have influenced the 
government’s position on this issue.281   
The Spanish government’s proposal to prohibit almost all abortions generated 
enormous anti-government protests.282  The refusal to include an exception for cases 
of fetal impairment was particularly controversial and generated opposition even 
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among members of the ruling party.283  The government initially attempted to 
address this opposition by promising to word the final legislation so that a pregnant 
woman could claim that her own health was endangered by a fetal impairment.284  In 
the end, however, the Spanish government was compelled to withdraw the proposed 
legislation altogether,285 prompting the Justice Minister to offer his resignation.286 
Yet opponents of abortion in other countries will very likely seize upon the 
Committee’s comments to Spain and Hungary in order to strengthen their arguments 
against abortion, particularly in the second trimester of pregnancy when fetal 
impairments are often diagnosed.287  
 
V.       CONCLUSION 
 By commenting on the legislative frameworks for abortion in Spain and 
Hungary, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has renewed the 
debate on the relationship between the CRPD and the laws or government policies 
that facilitate disability-selective abortion. This was probably inevitable given that 
disability rights organizations have the ability to submit alternative reports to the 
Committee. As more countries report to the Committee, other groups may highlight 
the expanding practice of prenatal testing, the laws that treat pregnancies differently 
on the ground of disability, and the “matter of fact” way that the medical profession 
and the general public have come to think about abortion on the basis of fetal 
impairment.  
Nevertheless, in this author’s opinion, the specific comments from the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to the governments of Spain 
and Hungary were far too simplistic and do not adequately acknowledge the tensions 
between reproductive freedom and the rights of persons with disabilities. The 
Committee’s comments imply that it would be sufficient to amend the unequal 
standards in the abortion laws, without suggesting more systemic ways of 
encouraging prospective parents to voluntarily continue a pregnancy that may lead to 
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the birth of a child with a disability. Ironically, Spain and Hungary could both 
comply with the Committee’s comments by amending their laws to provide all 
women with unfettered access to abortion. Such amendments would address what 
the Committee views as the formal discrimination in the legislative framework, but 
would do nothing to reduce the incidence of disability-selective abortions.  On the 
other hand, if a country moves in the opposite direction, and reduces access to 
abortion, it could have the effect of violating numerous human rights treaties, 
including the CRPD, which give persons with disabilities the right to determine the 
number and spacing of their children and the right to reproductive health services.288 
Such legislation could also motivate more women to seek illegal and unsafe 
abortions, which poses serious threats to their health and their right to life, as 
observed by the CEDAW Committee, the Human Rights Committee, and the 
Committee Against Torture.289 
This is an opportune time for the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities to consider the relationship between abortion and disability rights 
because it is in the process of developing a General Comment on Article 6 of the 
CRPD, which will address the intersectionality of gender and disability 
discrimination.290 With respect to abortion, the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities should examine the approach that the CEDAW Committee has 
taken to the practice of sex-selection.  While maintaining strong support for 
women’s right to access contraception and safe abortion services, the CEDAW 
Committee has also expressed concern regarding the practice of sex-selective 
abortion in states where it is prevalent.291  The CEDAW Committee has not ruled out 
using laws prohibiting sex selection as a means of preventing the systematic 
targeting of female fetuses for abortion. For example, it has urged the Peoples’ 
Republic of China to enforce its law against sex selection, as well as the laws 
prohibiting female infanticide.292 For the most part, however, the CEDAW 
Committee has focused on the obligation of states to redress the discriminatory 
attitudes and practices that lead parents to prefer male children. For example, the 
CEDAW Committee expressed concern at the “persistence of deep-rooted 
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stereotypes” that lead to sex-selective abortion in China and suggested a number of 
specific measures, such as textbook reform, that might help to overcome these 
stereotypes.293   
In the context of disability-selective abortion, many commentators have 
suggested that there should be reforms to the nature of the counseling and the 
“quality of life” assessments that are provided to prospective parents after they 
receive a diagnosis of fetal impairment.294 The Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities should ask governments about these processes and offer its 
expertise, so as to assist States Parties to the CRPD to develop a set of best practices. 
Helping governments to better implement Article 24, on the right to inclusive 
education, and Article 27, on the right to employment, would also give prospective 
parents more confidence that their children will enjoy full and meaningful lives if 
they are born with an impairment or if they acquire an impairment during life. These 
are just a few examples of systemic changes that could, over the long term, reduce 
the incidence of disability-selective abortion -- without insisting that governments 
remove all distinctions based upon fetal impairment from the laws governing access 
to abortion.    
Similarly, if the state of North Dakota is serious about preventing disability-
selective abortions, then it should consider a more systemic and less coercive 
approach.  Even if H.B. 1305 could survive constitutional scrutiny and be enforced, 
it would not prevent a woman from travelling outside North Dakota to obtain an 
abortion on the ground of fetal impairment. A more effective way of encouraging 
North Dakota parents to continue pregnancies where there is evidence of a fetal 
disability would be to provide more public funding for inclusive education.295 To that 
end, the United States ought to ratify the CRPD and use it as an additional tool in the 
movement for equality.  Although imperfect, the treaty represents a huge step 
forward in disability rights and international human rights law. United States 
ratification would help to change stereotypical perceptions and further implement the 
right to equality that was originally promised in the ADA and the IDEA. As Marsha 
Saxton observed many years ago, when discussing the lack of communication 
between pro-choice feminists and persons with disabilities, “clearly, there is work to 
be done.”296   
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